Abstract. We construct new families of elliptic curves over F p 2 with efficiently computable endomorphisms, which can be used to accelerate elliptic curvebased cryptosystems in the same way as Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) and Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) endomorphisms. Our construction is based on reducing Q-curves-curves over quadratic number fields without complex multiplication, but with isogenies to their Galois conjugates-modulo inert primes. As a first application of the general theory we construct, for every p > 3, two one-parameter families of elliptic curves over F p 2 equipped with endomorphisms that are faster than doubling. Like GLS (which appears as a degenerate case of our construction), we offer the advantage over GLV of selecting from a much wider range of curves, and thus finding secure group orders when p is fixed. Unlike GLS, we also offer the possibility of constructing twist-secure curves. Among our examples are prime-order curves equipped with fast endomorphisms, with almost-prime-order twists, over F p 2 for p = 2 127 − 1 and p = 2 255 − 19.
Introduction
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q , and let G ⊂ E (F q ) be a cyclic subgroup of prime order N . When implementing cryptographic protocols using G , the fundamental operation is scalar multiplication (or exponentiation):
Given P in G and m in Z, compute [m]P := P ⊕ · · · ⊕ P m times .
The literature on general scalar multiplication algorithms is vast, and we will not explore it in detail here (see [11, §2.8, §11 .2] and [5, Chapter 9] for introductions to exponentiation and multiexponentiation algorithms). For our purposes, it suffices to note that the dominant factor in scalar multiplication time using conventional algorithms is the bitlength of m. As a basic example, if G is a generic cyclic abelian group, then we may compute [m]P using a variant of the binary method, which requires at most ⌈log 2 m⌉ doublings and (in the worst case) about as many addings in G .
But elliptic curves are not generic groups: they have a rich and concrete geometric structure, which should be exploited for fun and profit. For example, endomorphisms of elliptic curves may be used to accelerate generic scalar multiplication algorithms, and thus to accelerate basic operations in curve-based cryptosystems.
Suppose E is equipped with an efficient endomorphism ψ, defined over F q . By efficient, we mean that we can compute the image ψ(P ) of any point P in E (F q ) for the cost of O(1) operations in F q . In practice, we want this to cost no more than a few doublings in E (F q ).
Assume ψ(G ) ⊆ G , or equivalently, that ψ restricts to an endomorphism of G . 1 Now G is a finite cyclic group, isomorphic to Z/N Z; and every endomorphism of Z/N Z is just an integer multiplication modulo N . Hence, ψ acts on G as multiplication by some integer eigenvalue λ ψ : that is,
The eigenvalue λ ψ must be a root in Z/N Z of the characteristic polynomial of ψ.
Returning to the problem of scalar multiplication: we want to compute and a two-dimensional multiexponentation such as Straus's algorithm [26] , which requires has a loop length of log 2 (a, b) ∞ (ie, log 2 (a, b) ∞ doubles and as many adds; recall that (a, b) ∞ = max(|a|, |b|)). If λ ψ is not too small, then we can easily find (a, b) such that log 2 (a, b) ∞ is roughly half of log 2 N . (We remove the "If" and the "roughly" for our ψ in §4.) The endomorphism lets us replace conventional log 2 N -bit scalar multiplications with 1 2 log 2 N -bit multiexponentiations. In terms of basic binary methods, we are halving the loop length, cutting the number of doublings in half.
Of course, in practice we are not halving the execution time. The precise speedup ratio depends on a variety of factors, including the choice of exponentiation and multiexponentiation algorithms, the cost of computing ψ, the shortness of a and b on the average, and the cost of doublings and addings in terms of bit operations-to say nothing of the cryptographic protocol, which may prohibit some other conventional speedups. For example: in [12] , Galbraith, Lin, and Scott report experiments where cryptographic operations on GLS curves required between 70% and 83% of the time required for the previous best practice curves-with the variation depending on the architecture, the underyling point arithmetic, and the protocol. 1 This assumption is satisfied almost by default in the context of old-school discrete log-
and N | q − 1; such E are cryptographically inefficient, and discrete logs in G are vulnerable to the Menezes-Okamoto-Vanstone reduction [21] . However, these G do arise naturally in pairing-based cryptography; in that context the assumption should be verified carefully.
To put this technique into practice, we need a source of cryptographic elliptic curves equipped with efficient endomorphisms. To date, in the large characteristic case 2 , there have been essentially only two constructions:
1. The classic Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) construction [13] . Elliptic curves over number fields with explicit complex multiplication by CM-orders with small discriminants are reduced modulo suitable primes p; an explicit endomorphism on the CM curve reduces to an efficient endomorphism over the finite field. 2. The more recent Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) construction [12] . Here, curves over F p are viewed over F p 2 ; the p-power sub-Frobenius induces an extremely efficient endomorphism on the quadratic twist (which can have prime order).
These two constructions have since been combined to give 3-and 4-dimensional variants [18, 30] , and extended to hyperelliptic curves in a variety of ways [3, 17, 24, 27] . However, basic GLV and GLS remain the archetypal constructions. Q-curves are well-established objects of interest in number theory, where they have formed a natural setting for generalizations of the Shimura-Taniyama conjecture. Ellenberg's survey [9] gives an excellent introduction to this beautiful theory.
Our application of quadratic Q-curves is rather more prosaic: given a d-isogeny E → σ E over a quadratic field, we reduce modulo an inert prime p to obtain an isogeny E → σ E over F p 2 . We then exploit the fact that the p-power Frobenius isogeny maps σ E back onto E ; composing with the reduced d-isogeny, we obtain an endomorphism of E of degree d p. For efficiency reasons, d must be small; it turns out that for small values of d, we can write down one-parameter families of Q-curves (our approach below was inspired by the explicit techniques of Hasegawa [15] ). We thus obtain one-parameter families of elliptic curves over F p 2 equipped with efficient non-integer endomorphisms. For these endomorphisms we can give convenient explicit formulae for short scalar decompositions (see §4).
For concrete examples, we concentrate on the cases d = 2 and 3 (in §5 and §6, respectively), where the endomorphism is more efficient than a single doubling (we briefly discuss higher degrees in §10). For maximum generality and flexibility, we define our curves in short Weierstrass form; but we include transformations to Montgomery, twisted Edwards, and Doche-Icart-Kohel models where appropriate in §8.
Comparison with GLV. Like GLV, our method involves reducing curves defined over number fields to obtain curves over finite fields with explicit complex multiplication.
However, we emphasise a profound difference: in our method, the curves over the number fields generally do not have complex multiplication themselves.
GLV curves are necessarily isolated examples-and the really useful examples are extremely limited in number (see [18, App. A] for a list of curves). The scarcity of GLV curves 3 is their Achilles' heel: as noted in [12] , if p is fixed then there is no guarantee that there will exist a GLV curve with prime (or almost-prime) order over F p . Consider the situation discussed in [12, §1] : the most efficient GLV curves have CM discriminants −3 and −4. If we are working at a 128-bit security level, then the choice p = 2 255 − 19 allows particularly fast arithmetic in F p . But the largest prime factor of the order of a curve over F p with CM discriminant −4 (resp. −3) has 239 (resp. 230) bits: using these curves wastes 9 (resp. 13) potential bits of security. In fact, we are lucky with D = −3 and −4: for all of the other discriminants offering endomorphisms of degree at most 3, we can do no better than a 95-bit prime factor, which represents a catastrophic 80-bit loss of relative security.
In contrast, our construction yields true families of curves, covering ∼ p isomorphism classes over F p 2 . This gives us a vastly higher probability of finding prime (or almost-prime)-order curves over practically important fields.
Comparison with GLS. Like GLS, we construct curves over F p 2 equipped with an inseparable endomorphism. While these curves are not defined over the prime field, the fact that the extension degree is only 2 means that Weil descent attacks offer no advantage when solving DLP instances (see [12, §9] ). And like GLS, our families offer around p distinct isomorphism classes of curves, making it easy to find secure group orders when p is fixed.
But unlike GLS, our curves have j -invariants in F p 2 : they are not isomorphic to or twists of subfield curves. This allows us to find twist-secure curves, which are resistant to the Fouque-Lercier-Réal-Valette fault attack [10] . As we will see in §9, our construction reduces to GLS in the degenerate case d = 1 (that is, where φ is an isomorphism). Our construction is therefore a sort of generalized GLS-though it is not the higher-degree generalization anticipated by Galbraith, Lin, and Scott themselves, which composes the sub-Frobenius with a non-rational separable homomorphism and its dual homomorphism (cf. [12, Theorem 1] ).
In §4, we prove that we can immediately obtain decompositions of the same bitlength as GLS for curves over the same fields: the decompositions produced by our Proposition 2 are identical to the GLS decompositions of [12, Lemma 2] when 3 The scarcity of useful GLV curves is easily explained: efficient separable endomorphisms have extremely small degree (so that the dense defining polynomials can be evaluated quickly). But the degree of the endomorphism is the norm of the corresponding element of the CM-order; and to have non-integers of very small norm, the CM-order must have a tiny discriminant. Up to twists, the number of elliptic curves with CM discriminant D is the Kronecker class number h(D), which is in O( D). Of course, for the tiny values of D in question, the asymptotics of h(D) are irrelevant; for the six D corresponding to endomorphisms of degree at most 3, we have h(D) = 1, so there is only one j -invariant. For D = −4 (corresponding to j = 1728) there are two or four twists over F p ; for D = −3 (corresponding to j = 0) we have two or six, and otherwise we have only two. In particular, there are at most 18 distinct curves over F p with a non-integer endomorphism of degree at most 3. d = 1, up to sign. For this reason, we do not provide extensive implementation details in this paper: while our endomorphisms cost a few more F q -operations to evaluate than the GLS endomorphism, this evaluation is typically carried out only once per scalar multiplication. This evaluation is the only difference between a GLS scalar multiplication and one of ours: the subsequent multiexponentiations have exactly the same length as in GLS, and the underlying curve and field arithmetic is the same, too.
Notation and conventions
Throughout, we work over fields of characteristic not 2 or 3. Let
be an elliptic curve over such a field K .
Galois conjugates.
For every automorphism σ of K , we define the conjugate curve
If φ : E → E 1 is an isogeny, then we obtain a conjugate isogeny
by applying σ to the defining equations of φ, E , and E 1 .
Quadratic twists. For every
The twist E λ is defined over K (λ 2 ), and
is defined over F q because µ 1 /µ 2 must be a square). When the choice of nonsquare is not important, we denote the quadratic twist by
(Conjugates are marked by left-superscripts, twists by right-superscripts.)
The trace. If K = F q , then π E denotes the q-power Frobenius endomorphism of E . Recall that the characteristic polynomial of π E has the form
The integer tr(E ) is the trace of E ; we have #E (F q ) = q + 1 − tr(E ) and tr(E ′ ) = −tr(E ).
p-th powering. We write (p) for the p-th powering automorphism of F p . Note that (p) is almost trivial to compute on
Quadratic Q-curves and their reductions
Suppose E /Q( ∆) is a quadratic Q-curve of prime degree d (cf. Definition 1), where ∆ is a discriminant prime to d, and let φ : E → σ E be the corresponding d-isogeny. In general, φ is only defined over a quadratic extension Q( ∆, γ) of Q( ∆). We can compute γ from ∆ and ker φ using [14, Proposition 3.1], but after a suitable twist we can always reduce to the case where γ = ±d (see [14, remark after Lemma 3.2]). The families of explicit Q-curves of degree d that we treat below have their isogenies defined over Q( ∆, −d); so to simplify matters, from now on we will Assume φ is defined over Q( ∆, −d ).
Let p be a prime of good reduction for E that is inert in Q( ∆) and prime to d. If O ∆ is the ring of integers of Q( ∆), then
Looking at the Galois groups of our fields, we have a series of injections
The image of (p) in Gal(Q( ∆)/Q) is σ, because p is inert in Q( ∆). When extending σ to an automorphism of Q( ∆, −d ), we extend it to be the image of (p): that is,
for all α, β, γ, and δ ∈ Q. (Recall that the Legendre symbol n p is 1 if n is a square mod p, −1 if n is not a square mod p, and 0 if p divides n.) Now let E be the reduction modulo p of E . The curve σ E reduces to
Applying σ to φ, we obtain a second d-isogeny φ are-up to sign-the dual isogenies of φ and φ, respectively. The sign ǫ p depends on p (as well as on φ): if τ is the extension of σ to Q( ∆, −d) that is not the image of (p), then
Clearly,
π 0 ) is the p 2 -power Frobenius endomorphism of E (resp.
We also obtain an endomorphism ψ ′ on the quadratic twist E ′ of E . Indeed, if
Proposition 1. With the notation above:
There exists an integer r satisfying dr
The characteristic polynomial of both ψ and ψ ′ is
Hence
Choosing a nonsquare µ in F p 2 , so E ′ = E µ and ψ ′ = ψ µ , we find
Using the relations π 2 E −tr(E )π E +p 2 = 0 and π 2 E ′ +tr(E )π E ′ +p 2 = 0, we verify that the expressions for ψ and ψ ′ give the two square roots of ǫ p dπ E in Q(π E ), and −ǫ p dπ E ′ in Q(π ′ E ), and that the claimed characteristic polynomial is satisfied.
⊓ ⊔ Now we just need a source of quadratic Q-curves of small degree. Elkies [8] shows that all Q-curves correspond to rational points on certain modular curves: Let X * (d) be the quotient of the modular curve X 0 (d) by all of its Atkin-Lehner involutions, let K be a quadratic field, and let σ be the involution of K over Q. If e is a point in
Luckily enough, for very small d, the curves X 0 (d) and X * (d) have genus zero-so not only do we get plenty of rational points on X * (d), we get a whole one-parameter family of Q-curves of degree d. Hasegawa gives explicit universal curves for d = 2, 3, and 7 in [15, Theorem 2.2]: for each squarefree integer ∆ = 1, every Q-curve of degree d = 2, 3, 7 over Q( ∆) is Q-isomorphic to a rational specialization of one of these families. Hasegawa's curves for d = 2 and 3 ( E 2,∆,s in §5 and E 3,∆,s in §6) suffice not only to illustrate our ideas, but also to give useful practical examples.
Short scalar decompositions
Before moving on to concrete constructions, we will show that the endomorphisms developed in §3 yield short scalar decompositions. Proposition 2 below gives explicit formulae for producing decompositions of at most ⌈log 2 p⌉ bits.
Suppose G is a cyclic subgroup of E (F p 2 ) such that ψ(G ) = G , and let N = #G . Proposition 1 shows that ψ acts as a square root of ǫ p d on G : its eigenvalue is
We want to compute a decomposition
so as to efficiently compute
The decomposition of m is not unique: far from it. The set of all decompositions (a, b) of m is the coset (m, 0) + L , where
is the lattice of decompositions of 0 (that is, of (a, b) such that a +bλ ψ ≡ 0 (mod N )).
We want to find a decomposition where a and b have minimal bitlength: that is, where ⌈log 2 (a, b) ∞ ⌉ is as small as possible. The standard technique is to (pre)-compute a short basis of L , then use Babai rounding [1] to transform each scalar m into a short decomposition (a, b). The following lemma outlines this process; for further detail and analysis, see [13, §4] 
Proof. This is just [13, Lemma 2] (under the infinity norm). ⊓ ⊔
We see that better decompositions of m correspond to shorter bases for L . If |λ ψ | is not unusually small, then we can compute a basis for L of size O( N ) using the Gauss reduction or Euclidean algorithms (cf. [13, §4] and [11, §17.1.1]). 4 The basis depends only on N and λ ψ , so it can be precomputed.
In our case, lattice reduction is unnecessary: we can immediately write down two linearly independent vectors in L that are "short enough", and thus give explicit formulae for (a, b) in terms of m. These decompositions have length ⌈log 2 p⌉, which is near-optimal in cryptographic contexts: if N ∼ #E (F p 2 ) ∼ p 2 , then log 2 p ∼ 1 2 log 2 N . 4 Bounds on the constant hidden by the O( N ) are derived in [24] , but they are suboptimal for our endomorphisms. In cryptographic contexts, Proposition 2 gives better results. 
Proposition 2. With the notation above: given an integer m, let
a = m − m(1 + ǫ p p)/#E (F p 2 ) (1 + ǫ p p) + mr /#E (F p 2 ) ǫ p dr and b = m(1 + ǫ p p)/#E (F p 2 ) r − mr /#E (F p 2 ) (1 + ǫ p p).
Endomorphisms from quadratic Q-curves of degree 2
Let ∆ be a squarefree integer. Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family of elliptic curves over Q( ∆) by
where s is a free parameter taking values in Q [15, Theorem 2.2]. The discriminant of E 2,∆,s is 2 9 · 3 6 (1 − s 2 ∆)(1 + s ∆), so the curve E 2,∆,s has good reduction at every p > 3 with ∆ p = −1, for every s in Q.
The curve E 2,∆,s has a rational 2-torsion point (4, 0), which generates the kernel of a 2-isogeny φ 2,∆,s : E 2,∆,s → σ E 2,∆,s defined over Q( ∆, −2). We construct φ 2,∆,s explicitly: Vélu's formulae [28] define the (normalized) quotient E 2,∆,s → E 2,∆,s /〈(4, 0)〉, and then the isomorphism E 2,∆,s /〈(4, 0)〉 → σ E 2,∆,s is the quadratic twist δ(1/ −2). Composing, we obtain an expression for the isogeny as a rational map:
Conjugating and composing, we recognise that . Let ∆ be a nonsquare
. 5 The choice of ∆ is (theoretically) irrelevant, since all quadratic extensions of F p are isomorphic. If ∆ and ∆ ′ are two nonsquares in F p , then ∆/∆ ′ = a 2 for some a in F p , so E 2,∆,t and E 2,∆ ′ ,at are identical. We are therefore free to choose any practically convenient value for ∆, such as one permitting faster arithmetic in F p ( ∆).
For each s in F p , let E 2,∆,s be the elliptic curve over F p 2 defined by
Then E 2,∆,s has an efficient F p 2 -endomorphism
of degree 2p, such that
for some integer r satisfying 2r 2 = 2p + ǫ p tr(E 2,∆,s ). The characteristic polynomial of
, and P 2,∆,s (ψ
Proof. Reduce E 2,∆,s and φ 2,∆,s mod p and compose with π 0 as in §3, then apply Proposition 1 using Eq.
Applying Proposition 2, we can decompose scalar multiplications in G as [m]P = [a]P + [b]ψ 2,∆,s (P ) where a and b have at most ⌈log 2 p⌉ bits.
Proposition 3. Theorem 1 yields at least p − 3 non-isomorphic curves (and at least 2p − 6 non-F p 2 -isomorphic curves, if we count the quadratic twists) equipped with efficient endomorphisms.
Proof. It suffices to show that the j -invariant j E 2,∆,s = 2 6 (5−3s ∆)
takes at least 
Solving the simultaneous equations, discarding the solutions that can never be in F p , and dividing by two (since (s 1 , s 2 ) and (s 2 , s 1 ) represent the same collision) yields at most 3 collisions
We observe that σ E 2,∆,s = E 2,∆,−s , so we do not gain any more isomorphism classes in Proposition 3 by including the codomain curves.
Endomorphisms from quadratic Q-curves of degree 3
Let ∆ be a squarefree discriminant; Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family of elliptic curves over Q( ∆) by
where s is a free parameter taking values in Q. As for the curves in §5, the curve E 3,∆,s has good reduction at every p > 3 with ∆ p = −1, for every s in Q.
The curve E 3,∆,s has a subgroup of order 3 defined by the polynomial x − 3, consisting of 0 and (3, ±2(1−s ∆)). Exactly as in §5, taking the Vélu quotient and twisting by 1/ −3 yields an explicit 3-isogeny φ 3,∆,s : E 3,∆,s → σ E 3,∆,s ; its sign function is
Theorem 2. Let p > 3 be a prime, and define ǫ p as in Eq. (6.2). Let ∆ be a nonsquare
For each s in F p , we let E 3,∆,s be the elliptic curve over F p 2 defined by
Then E 3,∆,s has an efficient F p 2 -endomorphism
for some integer r satisfying 3r 2 = 2p + ǫ p tr(E 3,∆,s ). The characteristic polynomial of
, and ψ Proof. The proof is exactly as for Proposition 3. ⊓ ⊔
Cryptographic-sized curves
We will now exhibit some curves with our families with cryptographic parameter sizes, and secure and twist-secure group orders. We computed the curve orders below using Magma's implementation of the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin algorithm [23, 19, 4] . First, consider the degree-2 curves of §5. By definition, E 2,∆,s and its quadratic twist E ′ 2,∆,s have points of order 2 over F p 2 : they generate the kernels of our endomorphisms. If p ≡ 2 (mod 3), then 2r 2 = 2p + ǫ p tr(E ) implies tr(E ) ≡ 0 (mod 3), so
is divisible by 3. However, when p ≡ 1 (mod 3) we can hope to find curves of order twice a prime whose twist also has order twice a prime. Now, consider the degree-3 curves of §6. The order of E 3,∆,s (F p 2 ) is always divisible by 3: the kernel of ψ 3,∆,s is generated by the rational point (3,C 3,∆ (s)). However, on the quadratic twist, the nontrivial points in the kernel of ψ [20] . The endomorphism is defined (on the X and Z coordinates) by
Twisted Edwards models. Every Montgomery model corresponds to a twisted Edwards model (and vice versa) [2, 16] . With u = X /Z and v = Y /Z , the birational maps
take us between the Montgomery model of Eq. (8.1) and the twisted Edwards model
, where
Doche-Icart-Kohel models. Doubling-oriented Doche-Icart-Kohel models of elliptic curves are defined by equations of the form
These curves have a rational 2-isogeny φ, with kernel 〈(0, 0)〉; in this form, we can double more quickly by using the decomposition [2] = φ † φ (see [7, §3 .1] for details). Our curves E 2,∆,s come equipped with a rational 2-isogeny, so it is natural to try putting them in Doche-Icart-Kohel form. The isomorphism
takes us from E 2,∆,s into a doubling-oriented Doche-Icart-Kohel model
While E DIK 2,∆,s is defined over F p 2 , the isomorphism is only defined over 
Degree one: GLS as a degenerate case
Returning to the framework of §3, suppose E is a curve defined over Q, and baseextended to Q( D): then E = σ E , and we can apply the construction of §3 taking φ : E → σ E to be the identity map. Reducing modulo an inert prime p, the endomorphism ψ is nothing but π 0 (which is an endomorphism, since E is a subfield curve). We have ψ 2 = π 2 0 = π E , so the eigenvalue of ψ is ±1 on cryptographic subgroups of E (F p 2 ). Clearly, this endomorphism is of no use to us for scalar decompositions.
However, looking at the quadratic twist E ′ , the twisted endomorphism ψ ′ satisfies (ψ ′ ) 2 = −π E ′ ; the eigenvalue of ψ ′ on cryptographic subgroups is a square root of −1. We have recovered the Galbraith-Lin-Scott endomorphism (cf. [12, Theorem 2] 
, so j ( E ) is in Q, and E is isomorphic to (or a quadratic twist of) a curve defined over Q. We note that in the case d = 1, we have r = ±t 0 in Proposition 1, and the basis constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 is (up to sign) the same as the basis of [12, Lemma 3] .
While E ′ (F p 2 ) may have prime order, E (F p 2 ) cannot: the points fixed by π 0 form a subgroup of order p + 1 − t 0 , where t 2 0 − 2p = tr(E ) (the complementary subgroup, where π 0 has eigenvalue −1, has order p +1+t 0 ). We see that the largest prime divisor of #E (F p 2 ) can be no larger than O(p). If we are in a position to apply the FouqueLercier-Réal-Valette fault attack [10] -for example, if Montgomery ladders are used for scalar multiplication and multiexponentiation-then we can solve DLP instances in E ′ (F p 2 ) in O(p 1/2 ) group operations (in the worst case!). While O(p 1/2 ) is still exponentially difficult, it falls far short of the ideal O(p) for general curves over F p 2 . GLS curves should therefore be avoided where the fault attack can be put into practice.
Higher degrees
We conclude with some brief remarks on Q-curves of other small degrees. Hasegawa provides a universal curve for d = 7 (and any ∆) in [15, Theorem 2.2], and our results for d = 2 and d = 3 carry over to d = 7 in an identical fashion, though the endomorphism is slightly less efficient in this case (its defining polynomials are sextic).
For d = 5, Hasegawa notes that it is impossible to give a universal Q-curve for every discriminant ∆: there exists a quadratic Q-curve of degree 5 over Q( ∆) if and only if 5 p i = 1 for every prime p i = 5 dividing ∆ [15, Proposition 2.3]. But this is no problem when reducing modulo p, if we are prepared to give up the freedom of choosing ∆: we could take ∆ = −11 for p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and ∆ = −1 for p ≡ 3 (mod 4), and then use the curves defined in [15, Table 6 ].
Composite degree Q-curves (such as d = 6 and 10) promise more interesting results, as do exceptional CM specializations of the universal curves; we will return to these cases in future work. Degrees greater than 10 yield less efficient endomorphisms, and so are less interesting from a practical point of view.
